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SOME COMMENTS ON RULEMAKING
AT THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION
EDWARD KWAKWA*
I.  INTRODUCTION
An organization’s ability to reflect and respond to the changing
needs and demands of its constituents by adopting rapid and effective
means of rulemaking is one of its most important features.  This abil-
ity is particularly important in the field of intellectual property.  Rules
concerning intellectual property have been adopted traditionally by
the treaty method.  As a result of rapid advances in technology, how-
ever, traditional treaty-making processes are now unsuited to the re-
alities of intellectual property law.  This poses a challenge to the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the specialized
agency of the United Nations (U.N.) whose mandate is the promotion
and protection of intellectual property worldwide.  In order to ensure
WIPO’s continued relevance, viability, and legitimacy in an increas-
ingly globalized world, the Organization must adapt its traditional
rulemaking processes by adopting more rapid, transparent, effective,
and politically acceptable means of norm creation.  This paper dis-
cusses the extent to which advances in technology and other devel-
opments in related areas have influenced the ways in which WIPO
addresses the issue of rulemaking in the field of intellectual property.1
Copyright © by Edward Kwakwa
* LL.B., University of Ghana; LL.M., Queen’s University; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale Law School.  As-
sistant Legal Counsel, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Geneva.  This is a
modified version of a lecture delivered at Duke Law School on October 23, 2000, on the occa-
sion of the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law Speaker Series inaugural lec-
ture.  The views expressed here are my personal views and are not necessarily shared by WIPO
or by the United Nations.
1. In this paper, I draw specifically on my experience as a lawyer at two different interna-
tional, intergovernmental organizations: the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
and the World Trade Organization (WTO).  These organizations represent two different institu-
tions and structures within the paradigm of intergovernmental organizations: WIPO is not part
of the United Nations proper, but is a specialized agency of the United Nations; and the WTO is
neither an organ nor a specialized agency of the United Nations, but an autonomous interna-
tional organization.  At WTO, I worked as a Legal Affairs Officer in the Technical Cooperation
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II.  RULEMAKING IN GENERAL AND IN THE FIELD OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Since most of my examples are drawn from my present job as
Assistant Legal Counsel at WIPO, I will begin this discussion of
rulemaking in the intellectual property field with a brief description
of WIPO in order to provide the context in which the subsequent dis-
cussion takes place.
A. The World Intellectual Property Organization
The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization (the WIPO Convention) was signed in 1967, and en-
tered into force in 1970.2  WIPO’s origins pre-date the WIPO Con-
vention to 1883 and 1886, the years in which the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works were adopted.3  Legal
issues surrounding intellectual property were relevant and important
during, and even before the 1880s.  In 1883, the year in which the
Paris Convention was adopted, Johannes Brahms composed his third
Symphony, Robert Louis Stevenson wrote Treasure Island, and John
and Emily Roebling completed construction of New York’s Brooklyn
Bridge.4  All of these works of intellectual property required protec-
tion.
WIPO is responsible for promoting the protection of intellectual
property throughout the world and for the administration of various
multilateral treaties, which address the legal and administrative as-
pects of intellectual property.  The Secretariat of WIPO comprises
about 1000 staff members from some 85 countries.  The recently ap-
proved budget of the Organization for the 2002–2003 biennium is
678.4 million Swiss francs or 410 million U.S. dollars at today’s rate of
and Training Division; at WIPO, I am working as the Assistant Legal Counsel to the Organiza-
tion.
2. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (last amended Sept. 28, 1979).  For a detailed account of the his-
tory of WIPO, see generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1997).
3. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (last revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last
revised July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
4. See generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GENERAL
INFORMATION: WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO Publ. No. 400(E)
(2001).
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exchange.5  WIPO is largely self-financing.  The Organization gener-
ates over eighty-five percent of its income from fees paid by private
sector users of the international registration services provided by the
WIPO Secretariat.6  Six percent of the Organization’s income is re-
ceived from its 177 member states, and the remaining nine percent of
income comes from the sale of WIPO publications, fees related to the
arbitration and mediation services provided by WIPO, and interest
earnings.7
Membership in WIPO is open to (i) any state member of the
Paris or Berne Union; (ii) any other state, provided it is a member of
the U.N., any Specialized Agency of the U.N., IAEA, or party to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice; and (iii) any state that is
invited by the WIPO General Assembly to join the Organization.8
B. The Problem with Traditional Rulemaking Processes
International intellectual property regulation and oversight re-
quires a system of norm-creation that is flexible enough to adapt to a
dynamic, fast-paced, and technologically driven area of law.  This
fundamentally conflicts with the primary historical structure and
means of rulemaking in international law—the multilateral treaty-
making process.  WIPO has traditionally used the multilateral treaty-
making process to create rules under its auspices.  This process has
drawbacks.  Treaty-making in the intellectual property field has been
slow and time-consuming.  Most of the twenty-three treaties adminis-
5. Revised Draft Program and Budget 2002–2003, WIPO Doc. WO/PBC/4/2, at http://
www.wipo.int/eng/document/govbody/wo_pbc/doc/4_4.doc (Sept. 20, 2001).
6. Some of the WIPO Treaties relating to patents, trademarks and industrial designs en-
sure that a single international registration or filing will have effect in any of the designated or
relevant member states.  The WIPO Secretariat’s services under these treaties aim at simplifying
and reducing the cost of making individual or à la carte applications or filings in each country in
which protection for a given intellectual property right is sought.  General information is avail-
able at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en (last visited Nov. 23, 2001).
7. See Annual Report 46, WIPO Publ. No. 441(E) (2001).  WIPO does not have a system
of weighted voting.  Each member state belongs to one of fourteen contribution classes, but
their rights remain the same, irrespective of the contribution class to which they belong.  The
effect of the contribution system is that unlike the United Nations, for example, where the
United States pays some twenty-two percent of the Organization’s regular budget, at WIPO the
United States pays less than one percent of the operating budget of the Organization.  The five
largest contributing countries (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States)
each contribute under one percent of the Organization’s budget.
8. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note
2, at art. 5.  It is clear that any entity wishing to join WIPO will have to satisfy the threshold
question of statehood.  This contrasts with international organizations like the WTO, where
non-state entities, such as Hong Kong, Macau, and the European Communities are members.
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tered by WIPO were promulgated through a complicated process that
normally entailed the establishment of a Committee of Experts,
whose deliberation sometimes lasted several years.  The Committee’s
deliberations would usually be followed by the convention of a pre-
paratory committee for a diplomatic conference, and finally by a
diplomatic conference to adopt the treaty in question.  Even if this
process ran smoothly, it could take over five years to draft, negotiate,
and adopt a treaty.  Furthermore, a treaty adopted in this manner
would only bind those states that ratify or accede to it.
The treaty-making process could be delayed further by the fact
that both international and domestic requirements need to be fulfilled
before a treaty comes into force in the states concerned.  It generally
takes an inordinate amount of time to bring a treaty into force across
a geographically effective and pertinent area.  The so-called “Inter-
net” treaties are a good example.  In 1996, WIPO member states
adopted the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).9  The treaties update the
international protection of copyright and related rights by taking into
account, and including rules that better conform to, the realities of
the Internet age.  At the time of adoption, WIPO anticipated that the
treaties would receive the requisite thirty instruments of ratification
or accession quickly in order to enter into force in timely fashion.
This was considered crucial in light of the subject matter that the trea-
ties covered.  As of October 2001, however, the treaties have received
only twenty-eight and twenty-six such instruments respectively.10
Thus, these two “Internet” treaties, which should have entered into
force some three or more years ago, in all likelihood will not enter
into force until the first half of 2002, more than six years after their
adoption.  During this time the treaties have not fulfilled their pur-
9. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, WIPO Publ. No. 226(E) [herein-
after WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76, WIPO
Publ. No. 227(E) [hereinafter WPPT].
10. The WCT has been ratified or acceded to by the following twenty-eight states: Argen-
tina, Belarus, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, and the United States.  With the recent accession of Gabon and the Ukraine, the WCT has
received the requisite 30 instruments of ratification and will come into force on March, 6, 2002.
See World Intellectual Property Organization, Actions in Respect of Treaties Administered by
WIPO Not Yet In Force, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/docs/english/u-page31.doc (Oct. 22,
2001).  The WPPT has been ratified or acceded to by all the above countries, with the exception
of Gabon, Indonesia, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Peru, and the Ukraine.  Albania and Mali have ac-
ceded to the WPPT, but not to the WCT.  See id.
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pose of providing adequate solutions to changes resulting from new
economic, social, cultural, and technological developments.
Most disappointing is the fact that certain treaties may never en-
ter into force, even after considerable human and financial resources
have been expended on their drafting, negotiation, and adoption.  A
classic example of this is the Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.11  The treaty was adopted
in 1989, after more than five years of negotiations.  As of October
2001, twelve years after its adoption, the treaty has been ratified by
only one country and acceded to by another.12  Although it has been
incorporated into the World Trade Organization’s TRIPS Agree-
ment,13 it seems unlikely that the treaty ever will enter into force.14
Intellectual property is one of the most rapidly growing areas in
the practice of law, both nationally and internationally.  This naturally
raises the potential for an increasing number of international disputes
involving various forms of intellectual property.  It is imperative that
intellectual property law remain current, responding to today’s fast-
paced technological developments; this imperative, however, further
complicates the treaty-making process.  In addition to the drafting,
negotiation, and adoption processes, treaty amendment or revision
often requires a similarly time-consuming process of consultations
and negotiations.  Such amendments or revisions also are subject to
the same requirements of accessions or ratifications before entry into
force.  The lack of uniformity in the speed with which different states
initiate and complete their domestic procedures for adherence to such
amendments may result in a complicated and asymmetrical situation
among states that are parties to the same agreement, but not to sub-
sequent amendments or revisions.  This poses serious problems for
the international intellectual property regime, a regime that requires
frequent amendments in order to update the treaties concerned.
11. Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1477, WIPO Publ. No. 202(E).
12. These are Egypt and Saint Lucia respectively.  The treaty was due to come into force
after the deposit of five instruments of ratification or accession.  See supra note 11, at art. 16(1).
13. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
art. 1(3), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31,
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
14. It is instructive to note that the United States and Japan, which together own about
seventy percent of the semi-conductor industry for integrated circuits, decided not to adhere to
the treaty.
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C. The Effect of Overlapping Mandates or Competing Legal
Regimes on Rulemaking Processes: the Example of Dispute
Settlement
A further difficulty arises with respect to rulemaking when the
initial problems or interests of states change in the intervening period
during negotiations on the treaty’s text.  An illustration of this prob-
lem is the WIPO draft Treaty on the Settlement of Disputes Between
States in the Field of Intellectual Property.15  This treaty was initially
proposed and discussed in 1989.  At that time, there was widespread
interest in the treaty’s subject among all the WIPO member states.  In
response to this interest, the governing bodies of WIPO established
what was referred to as a Committee on the Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes between States.16  The Committee started work in
1990 and held as many as eight sessions between 1989 and 1996.
In 1994, the member states of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) met at Marrakesh, Morocco, and signed the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.17  That
Agreement included the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)18 and the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding (DSU).19  The establishment of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) seems to have dissuaded some WIPO member states
from supporting a mechanism for settling intellectual property dis-
putes between states under WIPO auspices.
15. Proposed Treaty on the Settlement of Disputes Between States in the Field of Intellec-
tual Property, Apr. 30, 1997, WIPO Doc. No. WO/GA/XX1/2, at www.wipo.org\eng\document\
govbody\wo_gb_ga\doc\ga21_2.doc (last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
16. WIPO Doc. No. AB/XX/2, Annex. A, at 17 (May 31, 1989) (on file with the Duke
Journal of Comparative and International Law).
17. WTO Agreement, supra note 13.  The five main functions of WTO are provided in Ar-
ticle III of WTO’s constituent instrument.  They are (i) to facilitate the implementation, admini-
stration, and operation, and to further the objectives of the WTO Agreement; (ii) to provide a
forum for negotiations among WTO members and a framework for the implementation of the
results of those negotiations; (iii) to administer the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the
WTO; (iv) to administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the WTO; and (v) to cooperate
with the IMF and the World Bank “[w]ith a view to achieving greater coherence in global eco-
nomic policy-making.”  Id. at art. 3.  See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994)
[hereinafter GATT 1994].
18. See supra note 13.
19. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994).
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There were strong arguments in support of the proposal to es-
tablish a dispute settlement mechanism under WIPO, which would be
independent of the WTO dispute settlement body.  WIPO advocated
an independent WIPO forum for dispute settlement because not all
WIPO member states are WTO members.20  Indeed, significant
economies, such as Russia, continue to remain outside the WTO sys-
tem.21  Such states are therefore excluded from participating in the
WTO dispute settlement system.
Proponents of a dispute settlement mechanism at WIPO also fa-
vored an internal settlement mechanism because not all intellectual
property treaties are covered by the WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nism.  WIPO administers twenty-three treaties in the intellectual
property area; the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement only incorporates the
substantive provisions of a few of those WIPO Agreements.22  Fur-
thermore, not all intellectual property disputes are subject to resolu-
tion through the WTO dispute settlement system.  For example, Arti-
cle 9 of the TRIPS Agreement expressly excludes moral rights from
its purview.23
There are other important reasons in favor of the establishment
of a dispute settlement mechanism at WIPO.  First, WIPO is the only
intergovernmental organization whose mandate is exclusively in the
area of intellectual property law, an area that is increasingly special-
ized and technically sophisticated.  Indeed, WIPO has an ongoing re-
lationship of cooperation with its member states’ intellectual property
administrations, as well as numerous regional intergovernmental or-
ganizations dealing with intellectual property.  Further, almost 200 in-
ternational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) act as accred-
20. As of October 2001, the WTO had 142 members, and WIPO had 177 member states.
21. After fifteen years, negotiations for China’s terms of membership and its accession to
the WTO have finally been resolved.  On December 11, 2001, China will become a full member
of the WTO.  See Press Release, World Trade Organization, China to join on 11 December,
Chinese Taipei’s membership also approved (Nov. 11, 2001).
22. These are the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Rome Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, and the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 13, at art. 1(3).
23. Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement provides: “Members shall comply with Articles 1
through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto.  However, Members
shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred un-
der Article 6bis of that Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.”  See TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 13, at art. 9(1).  Article 6bis of the Berne Convention concerns the moral rights of
authors, namely to claim authorship, to object to certain modifications and other derogatory
actions, and means of redress.  See Berne Convention, supra note 3, at art. 6bis.
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ited observers at the meetings of WIPO’s member states.24  Second,
providing a dispute settlement mechanism within WIPO would result
in greater uniformity and consistency in the application and interpre-
tation of intellectual property laws.  Third, proponents of a dispute
settlement mechanism at WIPO argued that this would permit states
to settle their intellectual property disputes in a less politically
charged atmosphere, because there is no threat of trade sanctions at
WIPO.25
There were, however, also strong arguments in favor of a dispute
settlement system at the WTO.  Proponents asserted that the TRIPS
Agreement incorporates the substantive provisions of the more im-
portant intellectual property conventions, such as the Paris and Berne
Conventions, and therefore a WTO dispute settlement system would
cover all important aspects of intellectual property disputes.  Al-
though the main intellectual property treaties had dispute settlement
provisions, no state had ever resorted to them.  In contrast, WTO
members had invoked the dispute settlement provisions under the
TRIPS Agreement on several occasions during the WTO’s short exis-
tence.  This was seen as indicating that the earlier dispute settlement
provisions in the WIPO treaties were less than effective.26  Second,
proponents argued that states had a big stake in solving their intellec-
tual property disputes because of the direct harm they perceived to
24. Those NGOs that are accredited as observers are allowed to participate in the meetings
of WIPO’s member states, albeit with limited rights.  For example, the NGOs do not have vot-
ing rights, they only make their statements after the member states have made theirs, and
NGOs are not allowed to submit proposals, amendments or motions.
25. Unlike the WTO, there is no enforcement power or mechanism in WIPO, as is the case
in most other intergovernmental organizations.  The WTO is an exception in this regard.
26. There are several examples of WIPO-administered intellectual property treaties and
conventions that provide for dispute settlement by the International Court of Justice.  For ex-
ample, the Berne Convention provides:
Any dispute between two or more countries of the Union concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of this Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by any one of
the countries concerned, be brought before the International Court of Justice by appli-
cation in conformity with the Statute of the Court, unless the countries concerned
agree on some other method of settlement.
Berne Convention, supra note 3, at art. 33; see also Paris Convention, supra note 3, at art. 28
(using identical language); Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, art. 59, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 9
I.L.M. 978 (1970) (entered into force Jan. 24, 1978) (also using identical language).  The reluc-
tance of states to bring their disputes in such technical areas as intellectual property to the ICJ is
well known.  Complaints include the fact that reservations are permitted to the jurisdiction of
the ICJ, the length of time it takes before decisions are handed out, and the fact that private
claimants would need to have their claims espoused by their states at the ICJ.  It seems coun-
terintuitive to argue, however, that a dispute settlement provision is not effective because it has
not been used.  An equally plausible argument would be that the mere existence of those provi-
sions has had a restraining influence on the outbreak of such disputes.
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their trade and other economic interests (i.e., intellectual property
and trade were vitally and inextricably linked).  Therefore, they ar-
gued, it was more logical to settle intellectual property disputes under
the auspices of a trade body.  Third, it was argued that refraining
from establishing a second dispute settlement mechanism at WIPO
would minimize the risk of conflicts between two rival regimes and
eliminate the potential for duplication.
Ultimately, the failure of the WIPO draft Treaty for the Settle-
ment of Disputes, in the face of the establishment of a dispute settle-
ment mechanism under the WTO framework, illustrates the signifi-
cance of competing legal regimes or the existence of
intergovernmental organizations with mandates that create the poten-
tial for competing jurisdiction or duplication in efforts.27  In the con-
text of treaty-making, the problem arose because WIPO traditionally
had been the only intergovernmental organization with a mandate to
adopt norms in the intellectual property field.  This situation changed
when the TRIPS Agreement was adopted as part of the WTO
Agreement, thus creating uncertainty as to the appropriate forum for
the creation of intellectual property norms.
D. “Soft Law” as a Means of Norm Creation
The process of rulemaking in international law encompasses a
wide array of means, methods, and procedures.  Whatever the means
or process of rulemaking, a common goal is pervasive: to produce
rules, standards or guidelines that purport to govern the future con-
duct of particular actors over a specified range of activity.  The most
established form of rulemaking is the multilateral treaty-making pro-
cess, as discussed above.  Other forms of rulemaking include non-
binding agreements—declarations and decisions of international or-
ganizations, which include certain widely supported and generally ac-
cepted resolutions or declarations of the U.N. General Assembly
(UNGA).  In this regard, it is instructive that some international or-
ganizations have effectively used certain “soft law” instruments other
than treaties to generate new international law norms.  The term “soft
law” generally is used to refer to certain categories of norms, techni-
cally non-binding in nature, that states nonetheless follow in practice
or to which they at least subscribe.  Such norms are sometimes la-
27. I have elaborated on what I perceive to be increasing conflicts or overlaps of jurisdic-
tion between and among, in particular, international economic organizations.  See Edward
Kwakwa, Institutional Perspectives of International Economic Law, in PERSPECTIVES IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Asif Qureshi ed., forthcoming 2001).
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beled “guidelines,” “recommendations,” “resolutions,” or “stan-
dards.”  The concept of soft law has generated controversy in discus-
sions of the sources of international law.28  While it is not the purpose
of this essay to discuss the actual status of soft law in international
law, it will suffice to point out that various forms of soft law have
been established effectively in various fora and seem to be adhered to
by states, as illustrated by the discussion below.29
The most frequently cited forms of soft law are certain resolu-
tions and declarations of the UNGA.  While the U.N. Charter does
not provide the General Assembly with legislative powers, except for
specifically enumerated cases relating to procedural and budgetary
matters, this limitation has not precluded the Assembly’s rulemaking
activities.  The Assembly has promulgated multilateral conventions to
which all states may become parties, and states have demonstrated
acceptance of specific resolutions or declarations, guidelines, and
minimum rules or standards.  An example is the Declaration on Prin-
ciples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coop-
eration among States in Accordance with the Charter of the U.N.,30
adopted by the General Assembly without dissent, and now generally
accepted as a declaration of principles and rules of international law.
An even more prominent example is the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.31
Soft law, whether in the form of declarations, recommendations,
guidelines or codes, can impact the behavior of states and other rele-
vant entities significantly.  The increasing use of soft law is widely
recognized.  Certain multilateral treaties now contain references to
“internationally recognized norms and standards” and “established
principles” of international law.32  There has long been debate as to
28. On this subject, see generally Paul Szasz, General Law-Making Processes, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27–64 (Christopher Joyner ed., 1997); Frederic
Kirgis, Specialized Law-Making Processes, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 28, at 65–94; Panel Discussion of the American Society of International Law, A
Hard Look at Soft Law, PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 371–95 (1998).
29. See generally Christine Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change
in International Law, 38 ICLQ 850 (1989); Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Un-
derstanding ‘Soft Law,’ 30 MCGILL L.J. 37 (1984).
30. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970,
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
31. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71.
32. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted and opened for
signature July 17, 1998, art. 21(1), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999.
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whether state practice and/or opinio juris is evidenced not only in
formal treaty texts, but also in UNGA resolutions and decisions of in-
tergovernmental organizations.  According to one view, the general
acceptance of a principle by states, at an international conference or
at the UNGA, is sufficient to transform such a principle into a “gen-
erally accepted rule” of international law, as envisaged under Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.33  According to
another view, however, such principles only become accepted as in-
ternational law when they are incorporated into treaties or when they
ripen into custom.34
Soft law is used frequently as a norm-creation technique by in-
ternational organizations.  While the constituent instruments of most
international organizations establish the procedure by which member
states may promulgate rules governing activities within the organiza-
tion’s competence, the form and format of those procedures vary
widely.
One of the most unique examples of non-traditional norm-
creation is provided by the International Labor Organization (ILO).35
The process of treaty-making at the ILO is entrusted not only to gov-
ernments, but also to the International Labor Conference, the ple-
nary body of the ILO whose composition per member state is two
government representatives (one workers’ representative and one
employers’ representative).  ILO treaties are not signed, but are
adopted by the Conference by a majority of two-thirds of the votes
cast.  Member states are obliged then to submit the treaty to their
competent authorities for enactment of conforming domestic legisla-
tion.36  Governments whose domestic legislatures approve the treaty
must “ratify” the treaty, while governments whose legislatures do not
approve the treaty are required to report periodically to the ILO on
33. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, chap. II, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
34. See generally G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
203–210 (1993); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14, 694–696
(5th ed. 1998); MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
37–38 (5th ed. 1984).
35. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, June 28, 1919, Preamble to Part
XIII of the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America, the British Empire, France,
Italy, Japan and Poland, June 28, 1919 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles], 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 4
U.K.T.S., amended on several occasions and current revision reprinted in ILO, CONSTITUTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND STANDING ORDERS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE 5–24 (1980).  It is important to note that the Treaty of
Versailles and the current ILO Constitution are different documents.
36. Id. art. 19(2).
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the extent to which their law and practice are consistent with the
treaty, as well as the obstacles to ratification of the treaty.37  The ILO
Conference also has the power to supplement ILO treaties with rec-
ommendations adopted contemporaneously, and which frequently
are aimed at supplying details to the more general treaty provisions.
Such recommendations are also subject to reporting requirements.38
Under the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chi-
cago Convention), the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) has express authority to adopt international
standards and recommended practices.39  Such standards become ef-
fective upon approval by a majority of the Council’s thirty-six mem-
bers.40  However, a member state may opt out of its obligations if it
notifies ICAO that the state finds it impracticable to comply in all re-
spects with the standards in question.41
Under the World Health Organization (WHO) framework, the
Health Assembly is authorized to adopt, by simple majority, regula-
tions that are binding on all member states, except those that notify
the WHO Director General of reservations or rejection of the regula-
tions within a specified time.42  It is instructive to note that certain
WHO regulations have the force of treaties.43
Some international organizations have used “Codes” as an effec-
tive norm-creation technique.  An example is the Codex Alimentarius
produced jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
and WHO, which prescribes standards for all principal foods, and is
widely used in the international food industry.44
Other types of instruments, such as model laws and guidelines,
do not purport to codify international law, but nevertheless may be
37. Id. art. 19(5).
38. Id. art. 19(6).
39. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 54(1), 61 Stat. 1180, 1206
15 U.N.T.S. 295 (amended 28 Oct. 1990).
40. Id. arts. 50 (composition), 52 (voting).
41. Id. art. 38.
42. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC DOCUMENTS 7 (47th ed. 1998).
43. See Kirgis, supra note 28, at 74 n.48.  David Fidler also discusses the relation between
the WHO assembly enactments and international law. DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 58 (1999).
44. JOINT FAO/WHO CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS: FOOD LABELING
COMPLETE TEXTS (2000); see Kirgis, supra note 28, at 86 (noting that “Codex standards and
other Codex measures are widely used by governments and by the international food trade”);
see generally Oscar Schachter, The UN Legal Order: An Overview, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 28, at 3, 8.
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complied with by states and other entities for a variety of reasons.
Examples of these are the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration45 and the 1985 FAO Guidelines for the
Packaging and Storage of Pesticides.46  The 1975 Final Act of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,47 while explicitly
stating that it is not a treaty, is nevertheless often cited by states as an
instrument that sets out legal obligations.
The use of soft law approaches in other organizations demon-
strates that there are ways of enacting international law other than
through the traditional treaty method.  They also show that some of
those other methods have been used effectively in intergovernmental
organizations.  Until recently, the system of norm-making at WIPO
had been the traditional treaty method.  However, in order to remain
a viable and credible institution, tasked with the promotion and pro-
tection of intellectual property, WIPO has had to devise new and in-
novative forms of norm-creation that are effective, rapid, and gener-
ally accepted by the member states.  The formal rigidities and
problems associated with the treaty-making process in the field of in-
tellectual property would seem to dictate the need for a more trans-
parent, informal, and consensual method of norm creation.  In the last
few years, the Secretariat of WIPO has therefore explored other
means for advancing the development of international intellectual
property law that could supplement the current treaty procedures.
E. Proposals for Advancing the Development of Intellectual
Property Law
In 1999, the Assemblies of Member States of WIPO adopted a
Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known
Marks.48  In 2000, WIPO’s Assemblies of Member States approved a
45. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, Annex I, U.N. Sales No. E.95.V.18 (1995).
46. Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N., Guidelines for the Packaging and Storage of
Pesticides (1985), available at http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPP/Pesticid/Code/Download/
pacstor.doc (last visited Nov. 27, 2001).
47. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted Aug. 1,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
48. WIPO Doc. No. A/34/13 (Aug. 4, 1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/eng/document/
govbody/wo_gb_ab/doc/a34_13.doc (last visited Nov. 27, 2001).  The Resolution was aimed at
clarifying and supplementing existing international protection of well-known marks, under the
Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement.  In particular, it contains a list of factors to help
determine whether a mark is well known in a territory.
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Recommendation Concerning Trademark Licenses.49  In 2001, the
Assemblies of Member States of WIPO adopted a Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Indus-
trial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet.50
The Resolution and Recommendations listed above are all part
of the new ‘soft law initiative’ at WIPO.  While the U.N. and other in-
tergovernmental organizations have used soft law techniques for
some time, their use by WIPO is a recent development.  The decision
to introduce such initiatives, as a means of advancing the develop-
ment of intellectual property law, is largely a function of the inade-
quacies of the traditional treaty method described above.
The legal value of newly created norms generally depends on the
content of those norms and the procedures by which they were
adopted.  In general, such norms would seem to be of greater prece-
dential value if they satisfy the following criteria: (1) address matters
of importance to states; (2) codify, reaffirm, or clarify certain gener-
ally accepted or widely recognized norms; (3) are adopted by consen-
sus, by unanimity or by an overwhelming majority of the concerned
member states; (4) and are adopted through a process of transparent
and extensive consultations and negotiations.
The concerned WIPO member states normally analyze the value
of the norms in question closely before deciding to consent or ap-
prove them.  Such approval (or even acquiescence) by member states
to new norms, irrespective of the instruments or documents through
which such norms are adopted, obviously has great significance.  In
this regard, it is important to keep in mind that political commitment
often plays a vital role in international law, and may be no less impor-
tant than the legally binding effect of a treaty or a convention.
Under the proposed form of norm-creation, WIPO member
states still have ample opportunity to influence the form and content
of the norms as they are being prepared.  For the sake of effectiveness
and compliance with the rules in question, it is more important that
49. WIPO Doc. No. A/35/10 (July 26, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/eng/
document/govbody/wo_gb_ab/a34_13.doc (last visited Nov. 27, 2001).  The Recommendation
seeks to simplify and harmonize procedures relating to the recordal of trademark licenses.  In
that connection, it sets out a maximum list of indications and elements that may be required by
national or regional authorities when presented with a request for recordal, cancellation, or
amendment of the recordal of a license.
50. WIPO Doc. No. A/36/8 (June 18, 2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/eng/document/
govbody/wo_gb_ab/a34_13.doc (last visited Nov. 27, 2001).  The Recommendation seeks to
make all rights in distinctive signs that are of a territorial nature Internet-compatible, particu-
larly trademarks, trade names, and geographical indications.
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the rules satisfy the interests and concerns of the parties involved,
than that they be technically or legally binding.  To the extent that the
Resolutions and Recommendations are carefully negotiated, taking
into account the real status, rights, and interests of concerned states
and other actors on the international scene, and insofar as they con-
tain reasonable and practical provisions for implementation, WIPO
believes that they will invariably be regarded as binding instruments.
There is evidence that the Resolution and Recommendations passed
to date are already exercising a real influence on national law and
practice.  This may in part be attributable to their subject matter and
the conditions in which they were adopted.  In particular, they went
through a long process of negotiation and extensive, but informal,
consultations and therefore embody fairly representative views held
by WIPO member states.
This proposed form of norm-creation is particularly suited to the
field of intellectual property, which is a fast-paced and technologically
driven area of law demanding detailed and specific, but rapidly gen-
erated, norms.  A soft law approach has the advantage of greater
flexibility as a means of keeping up with rapidly changing develop-
ments.  In the field of technology, soft law instruments are easier to
adopt than treaties, and may be applied immediately by states.  In
other words, these instruments do not in a strict sense need to be im-
plemented via domestic legislation (e.g., in the United States, advice
and consent requirements would not have to be met).  In any event, it
is our expectation that some of these Resolutions and Recommenda-
tions could initially be adopted as a first step towards the negotiation
and conclusion of legally binding obligations, thus providing a basis
for a treaty regime.  Hopefully, such a supplementary means of norm-
creation will allow WIPO to promulgate norms more efficiently and
with greater precision than could be done via the traditional treaty-
making method.  The challenge is how best to make WIPO and an in-
tellectual property normative framework more effective and relevant
in an attempt to increase universal compliance with fundamental in-
tellectual property norms, while maintaining selectivity in the produc-
tion of new standards.
F. A Changing Playing Field
Another important aspect of rulemaking in the field of intellec-
tual property law is the changing nature of the participants in interna-
tional legal regulation.  I will use the advent of the Internet as an il-
lustrative example.  The Internet poses significant challenges to
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traditional international law paradigms.  Under traditional interna-
tional law, only states were regarded as competent participants in
norm-making.  In today’s knowledge-based economy, however, that
has changed dramatically.  In the particular example of the Internet,
perhaps the most active player is the Internet Corporation for As-
signed Names and Numbers (ICANN).51  In 1998, ICANN was
formed in response to a suggestion by the U.S. government that the
private sector create a body to assume responsibility for certain ad-
ministrative and technical aspects of the Domain Name system.  This
would facilitate centralization of  the Internet address space alloca-
tion and root server system management functions.  According to its
articles of incorporation, ICANN is a nonprofit public interest corpo-
ration organized under the California Nonprofit Public Benefit Cor-
poration Law.52  Therefore, ICANN is simply a U.S. entity and not an
intergovernmental organization with global representation.53
In its relatively short existence ICANN has significantly im-
pacted the governance of the Internet Domain Name system.  It has,
amongst other things, introduced seven new generic Top Level Do-
mains (gTLDs) into the Domain Name system.54  More significantly,
ICANN adopted a proposal by WIPO to establish the Uniform Do-
main Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP),55 a mechanism which
51. See ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, available at http://www.icann.org/general/
articles.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2001).
52. See id.
53. In response to criticism of its legitimacy, ICANN held a worldwide online vote in 2000
aimed at obtaining a large globally diverse membership.  As a result of that vote, five new
members were elected to the ICANN Board of Directors from each of five geographic regions:
Africa, Asia/Australia/Pacific, Europe, Latin America/Caribbean, and North America.  Infor-
mation about the members is available at http://members.icann.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2001).
54. At its meeting in November 2000, ICANN selected the following new gTLDs: .aero,
.biz, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro.  ICANN, Preliminary Report: Second Annual
Meeting and Organizational Meetings of the ICANN Board, 16 November 2000, available at
http:// www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-16nov00.htm#Second Annual Meeting (last visited
Nov. 24, 2001).
55. As explained in the Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, how-
ever, the UDRP
does not seek to regulate the whole universe of the interface between trademarks and
domain names, but only to implement the lowest common denominator of internation-
ally agreed and accepted principles concerning the abuse of trademarks.  The exercise
was less about legislation than about the efficient application of existing law in a mul-
tijurisdictional and cross-territorial space.
WIPO, The Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in the Internet Domain Name System:
Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, September 3, 2001, at 31, available
at http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/report/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2001).  The Second
WIPO Internet Domain Name Process involves more difficult questions that have far-reaching
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has resulted in the implementation of a successful administrative sys-
tem for resolving domain name disputes involving trademarks and a
system of best practices for domain name registration authorities, de-
signed to avoid such disputes.56  The UDRP is now used worldwide
and has, in effect, set clear standards for the resolution of intellectual
property disputes in cyberspace.  Clearly, the global reach and tech-
nological supremacy of the United States has not only made it an in-
dispensable actor in international law, but has also made some U.S.-
based non-governmental entities indispensable players in certain as-
pects of international legal regulation.  The success of ICANN dem-
onstrates that non-governmental entities are also playing a significant
role in norm-making and legal regulation in intellectual property and
other legal areas.
III.  CONCLUSION
I have sought in this paper to provide a brief overview of the
challenges posed by rapid advances in technology as an example of
some of the issues facing the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion in the constantly evolving field of intellectual property law.
The increasing pace of globalization, the ever-rapid advances in
technology, and the desire of international organizations to maintain
their relevance by adopting rapid and effective means of rulemaking
that are politically acceptable to their member states is an issue that is
likely to test the capacity of international organizations in the next
few years.  In the particular context of intellectual property law the
World Intellectual Property Organization seems, thus far, to be cop-
ing very well with this challenge.
implications for the manner in which the international community creates law in this completely
new area.  See id.
56. In its first year of operation alone, the UDRP of WIPO received some 2000 cases.  Sev-
eral of these cases were submitted by well-known celebrities, including Julia Roberts, Bruce
Springsteen, Venus and Serena Williams, Isabelle Adjani, and Madonna, as well as major cor-
porations, including Microsoft Corporation, General Electric Company, and Nokia Corpora-
tion.
